Research Group
in Analytic Philosophy

Abstract

The paper compares, in relation to their suitability to elucidate modal knowledge, two different epistemologies of counterfactuals: (EC) and (W), the latter being Williamson’s. While both (EC) and (W) might be said to explain the available data, only (W) is compatible with all counterpossibles being true—something on which Williamson’s counterfactual-based epistemology relies. A first problem is, therefore, that, in the absence of further, disambiguating data, Williamson’s choice of (W) is objectionably biased. A second, deeper problem is that (W) cannot satisfactorily elucidate modal knowledge. Third, the nature of this second problem favours (EC) as the most naturalistic epistemology of the two. After this, it is argued that Kment’s ontological analysis of necessity in terms of counterfactuals cannot be used to rescue Williamson’s epistemology—intended as naturalistic.